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One of the tasks of the HySafe Network of Excellence was the evaluation of available CFD 
tools and models for dispersión and combustión in selected hydrogen reléase scenarios 
identified as "standard benchmark problems" (SBEPs). This paper presents the results of 
the HySafe standard benchmark problem SBEP-V11. The situation considered is a high 
pressure hydrogen jet reléase from a compressed gaseous hydrogen (CGH2) bus in an 
underpass. The bus considered is equipped with 8 cylinders of 5 kg hydrogen each at 
35 MPa storage pressure. The underpass is assumed to be of the common beam and slab 
type construction with I-beams spanning across the highway at 3 m centres (normal to the 
bus), plus cross bracing between the main beams, and light armatures parallel to the bus 
direction. The main goal of the present work was to evalúate the role of obstructions on the 
underside of the bridge deck on the dispersión patterns and assess the potential for 
hydrogen accumulation. Four HySafe partners participated in this benchmark, with 4 
different CFD codes, ADREA-HF, CFX, FLACS and FLUENT. Four scenarios were examined in 
total. In the base case scenario 20 kg of hydrogen was released in the basic geometry. In 
Sensitivity Test 1 the reléase position was moved so that the hydrogen jet could hit directly 
the light armature on the roof of the underpass. In Sensitivity Test 2 the underside of the 
bridge deck was fíat. In Sensitivity Test 3 the reléase was from one cylinder instead of four 
(5 kg instead of 20). The paper compares the results predicted by the four different 
computational approaches and attempts to identify the reasons for observed disagree-
ments. The paper also concludes on the effects of the obstructions on the underside of the 
bridge deck. 
1. Introduction 
Within the framework of assessing the risk of hypothetical 
hydrogen releases from hydrogen vehicles, various environ-
ments have to be considered, e.g. urban, tunnels, garage etc. 
One of these environments could be an underpass below 
a highway. A related accident involving a petrol tanker under 
a bridge happened in San Francisco, USA recently (San-Fran-
cisco [12] and according to the reporters the "huge leaping 
flames from the exploding gasoline tanker melted the steel 
underbelly of the highway overpass, causing it to collapse 
onto the roadway below virtually ensuring major traffic 
problems". 
As to the authors' knowledge previous hydrogen safety 
related work on an underpass does not exist, but the previous 
work on tunnels is briefly reviewed given that there are strong 
similarities between an underpass and a tunnel. Earlier (and 
current) studies of hydrogen releases in tunnels include the 
work of Wilkening et al. [17], Venetsanos et al. [13], Middha and 
Hansen [9], Kumar et al. [7], Mukai et al. [11] and Baraldi et al. [2]. 
Wilkening et al. [17] considered hydrogen releases from 
a compressed gaseous hydrogen (CGH2) and liquefied hydrogen 
(LH2) car within a 200 m tunnel of horseshoe cross section 
within the EIHP project (www.eihp.org). Later, Venetsanos et al. 
[13] used the same tunnel geometry and investigated hydrogen 
and natural gas releases from a CGH2 and compressed natural 
gas (CNG) bus within the EIHP-2 project (www.eihp.org). Inboth 
studies only one car or one bus was involved and no other 
vehicles were assumed to be present. Later, in the work per-
formed within the HyTunnel internal project of HySafe NoE 
(www.hysafe.net) the previous studies were extended by 
considering the same tunnel cross section but assuming a rush 
hour with many vehicles present along the tunnel on both 
sides. The HyTunnel project also considered a tunnel with fíat 
roof and approximately the same cross sectional área in order 
to investígate the effect of the roof geometry. 
What the above mentioned studies did not examine was 
the presence of various obstacles along the tunnel roof. Such 
Fig. 1 - Geometry. I beams (in red), cross bracing and 
stiffeners (in blue), light armature (in yellow). 
(For interpretation of the references to colour in this ñgure 
legend, the reader is referred to the web versión of this 
article.) 
obstacles can affect the dynamics of both hydrogen (and 
natural gas) dispersión and combustión and the extreme case 
is an underpass with beam and slab construction of the type 
considered in this paper. If the geometry is appropriate, 
flammable hydrogen can be trapped within the roof structures 
and remain there for a long time and thus increase the risk 
associated with an accidental reléase significantly. However, 
the ventilation in underpasses would typically be much better 
than in longer tunnels. In case of the flammable mixture being 
ignited the presence of obstacles could enhance acceleration 
and turbulence production, parameters which can both lead 
to a transition to a fast deflagration or DDT (deflagration to 
detonation transition). 
Within the above framework, the focus of the present work 
was two-fold: to investígate the effects of the roof obstruc-
tions and at the same time to examine the variation between 
different partners' predictions. 
2. SBEP-V11 specif icat ions 
The situation considered is a hydrogen reléase from 
a stationary bus in an underpass (see Fig. 1). Ambient condi-
tions are quiescent with 15 °C temperature and 1 bar pressure. 
No other vehicles are assumed to be present except for the 
hydrogen bus. It is assumed that the bus remains upright after 
the incident (and at the same position). 
The underpass is assumed to be of the common beam and 
slab type and construction with I-beams spanning across the 
highway. The underpass has a span of 15 m (X) length of 42 m 
(Y) and height 6 m (Z) (to the underside of bridge deck). There 
are 0.8 m (Z-depth) I-beams at 3 m centres in Y direction (1 cm 
Y-thick web with 50 cm Y-ends) (in red, see Fig. 1). Each I-beam 
has stiffeners on both sides of the web at the cross bracing 
positions and mid-way between the braces (in blue). There are 
also 0.3 m deep cross bracings between the beams at supports, 
mid-span, and quarter-span (in blue). Finally there are light 
armatures:4m(Y) x 0.4 m(X) x 0.2 m(Z)located ata height of 
5 m(in yellow).The armature units are locatedevery2.5 minthe 
span (X) direction of the underpass (with first one at 2.3 m) and 
every 8 m along the highway (Y) direction (with first one at 3 m). 
The bus has width 2.55 m (X), length 12 m (Y), height to top 
of tanks 3.2 m (Z) and 30 cm spacing under the bus (the 
wheels are 80 cm diameter and 40 cm thick (X)). The lower left 
córner of the bus is located at horizontal position 8 m (X) and 
10 m (Y) (origin 0, 0, 0 is at the underpass córner). 
The bus is assumed equipped with an eight cylinder 
storage system at 35 MPa (two banks of four interconnected 
cylinders) as in Venetsanos et al. [13] containing in total 40 kg 
of hydrogen. Each cylinder is equipped with two pressure 
relief devices (PRDs) according to regulations. The PRD nozzle 
diameter is assumed to be 4 mm. Each group of four neigh-
bouring PRDs are vented into a 20 mm vent line. There are in 
total four such outlet vent lines. 
Four scenarios were examined in total, the base case and 
three sensitivity tests. 
• In the base case scenario the underpass geometry (basic 
geometry) is as described above. For this scenario it is 
Fig. 2 - Predicted mass flow rate for 20 kg hydrogen reléase 
at 35 MPa, ambient temperatura from 4x4 mm diameter 
nozzles. 
applied by UPM and GexCon. JRC followed a different approach 
as explained in section 3.2 below, but which led to practically the 
same mass flow rate curve as with the other partners. 
The hydrogen concentrations (v/v) are reported in this SBEP at 
10 monitor points (sensors) located every 4 m along the Y direc-
tion starting at X = 7.5 m, Z = 5.8 m and Y= 3 m. Also reported 
(optional) were the flammable volume and the equivalent stoi-
chiometric cloud volume Q9 = XXV x ubi x E)/(Ubi x E)stoich [9] 
as a function of time. Here, V is the flammable volume, Ubi is the 
laminar buming velocity (corrected for flame wrinkling/Lewis 
number effects), E is volume expansión caused by buming at 
constant pressure in air, and the summation is over all control 
volumes. Thus, Q9 cloud is a scaling of the non-homogeneous 
gas cloud to a smaller stoichiometric gas cloud with scaling 
parameters the expansión and the reactivity. 
assumed that we have simultaneous opening of the 4 PRDs 
that feed one of the outlet lines, which is located at position 
9 m, 20 m, 3.3 m, resulting in an upwards directed jet and 
reléase of 20 kg of hydrogen, which is the inventory of four 
cylinders. 
• In Sensitivity Test 1 the reléase position was modified such 
that the hydrogen jet hits the light armature (reléase posi-
tion 10 m, 20 m, 3.3 m). All other parameters were as in the 
base case. 
• In Sensitivity Test 2 the underside of the bridge deck at 
Z = 5 m was fíat (sensors are moved to 4.8 m, see below). All 
other parameters were as in the base case. 
• For Sensitivity Test 3 it was assumed that only one PRD was 
activated so only 5 kg of hydrogen (1 tank) were released. All 
other parameters were as in the base case. 
The leak rate was calculated by NCSRD using the GAJET 
integral code, as shown in Fig. 2. The calculation was performed 
for 1 cylinder (5 kg hydrogen) with 4 mm nozzle, real gas 
hydrogen properties and discharge coefficient 0.8. The rate was 
multiplied by 4 (effective nozzle diameter 8 mm) in case of the 4 
cylinders reléase. The leak rate calculated by NCSRD was also 
3. Modelling strategy 
The modelling options used by each partner are summarized 
in Tables 1 and 2. Details for each partner are given below. 
3.1. GexCon 
GexCon has used the FLACS code. Earlier validation work for 
hydrogen dispersión is summarized in Middha et al. [10]. FLACS 
uses a standard fe-e model for turbulence. Some modifications 
are however implemented [1,6]. These are, for example (a) the 
model for generation of turbulence behind sub-grid objects, (b) 
the model for the build-up of proper turbulence behind objects 
of a particular size for which the discretization produce too 
little turbulence, (c) the turbulent wall functions, (d) the 
buoyancy generated turbulence and (e) the initial turbulence/ 
inflow field calculated from Pasquill class. 
A structured Cartesian grid was used. The default grid 
resolution was 50 cm, and the grid was refined near the 
hydrogen reléase and near the ceiling as stratification was 
expected. The total number of cells ranged from about 240,000 
to 340,000 depending on the reléase rate (one cylinder or four 
cylinder reléase) and the geometry (fíat or with beams). The 
Table 1 
Partner 
GexCon 
NCSRD 
JRC 
UPM 
- Summary of modelling options by each partner. 
Domain Min cell 
35 x 72 x 14 m 13 cm horiz 
25 cm vert 
45 x 70 x 15 m 10 cm 
100 m diameter, - 1 m m 
38 m height 
15 x 62 x 9 m 1.5 c m 
Grid 
294,063 cells 
245,622 cells 
264,264 nodes, 12,98,267 
cells ( tetrahedrons, 
p r i sms and pyramids) 
Source 
(four cylinders) 
Initial fict. d iam. 13.5 cm 
Birch et al. [3], Initial 
fict. diam. 10.4 cm 
No fict. diam., 
Storage cylinder and 
8 m m nozzle included 
in calculations 
660,000 cells for the base Birch et al. [3], Initial 
case and 193,000 
for the sensitivity cases 
fict. diam. 10.4 cm 
Turbulence model 
Standard k-eps with 
buoyancy effects and 
additional turbulence 
generation behind 
objects of a particular size 
Standard k-eps with 
buoyancy effects 
SST 
Standard k-eps with 
buoyancy effects 
Discretization 
schemes 
Second order 
Kappa schemes 
First order upwind, 
Time steps le~6-0.1 
Second order accurate 
Third order 
MUSCL scheme, 
t ime steps 0.01-0.1 s 
grid was extended outside the underpass to have the 
boundary at the appropriate distance, in order to reduce the 
effect of the boundary conditions on the calculations. 
Second order schemes (Kappa schemes with weighting 
between second order upwind and second order difference, 
delimiters for some equations) were used. 
3.2. JRC 
JRC used the CFX 11 SPl code. Earlier related validatíon work 
using CFX can be found in [5,16]. In the present calculations 
turbulence was modelled using the SST turbulence model of 
CFX with buoyancy terms for production and dissipation 
being activated. For both the convective and the temporal 
terms second order accurate schemes were applied. 
Around the underpass a large hemispherical volume 
(environment) was placed as outer boundary of the compu-
tational domain. A large size was chosen in order to reduce the 
effect of the boundary conditions on the simulations. The 
outer surfaces of the computational domain were defined 
mainly as walls and only the uppermost part of the domain 
was defined as outlet which allows only flow out of the 
domain. By these means the formation of an artificial flow 
through the underpass was avoided. The mesh created for the 
base case included 264264 nodes or 1298267 cells (tetrahe-
drons, prisms and pyramids). 
The leak in the tank of the bus was calculated directly and 
not simulated by the Birch approach. A properly sized cylin-
drical volume (either representing four or one cylinders) was 
placed inside the bus combined with an outflow pipe of 8 mm 
(cross-section equivalent to four pipes of 4 mm diameter) or 
4 mm diameter at the given leak position. The flow through 
the leak was then calculated from the time varying pressure 
difference between tank and flow domain starting from the 
given initial tank pressure. Real gas conditions according to 
the Redlich-Kwong EoS were applied. The tank in the bus was 
dimensioned to contain 20 or 5 kg hydrogen (35 MPa, 15 °C) at 
the beginning of the simulation. 
Sufficiently small time steps together with a mesh refine-
ment in the jet región were necessary to simúlate the under 
expanded jet released from the high pressure tank. The 
calculated máximum jet velocities downstream of the leak 
were in the order of 2700 m/s. The resulting high momentum 
in the jet improved the gas mixing in the underpass around 
the bus considerably. Consequently hydrogen concentrations 
at monitor positions as discussed in the following paragraphs 
are often lower and more uniform than obtained by the Birch 
approach of the other partners. 
3.3. NCSRD 
NCSRD has used the ADREA-HF code. Earlier validatíon work 
using ADREA-HF code has been summarized in Venetsanos 
et al. [14]. The mixing of H2 with air was calculated by solving 
the three dimensional transient, fully compressible conser-
vation equations for mixture mass (continuity equation), 
mixture momentum (for the three velocity components) and 
the H2 mass fraction transpon equation. Turbulence was 
modelled using the two equation standard fe-e model of 
Launder and Spalding [8], modified for buoyancy effects. 
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Fig. 3 - Predicted flammable mixture volume (m3) histories per scenario case. Base case scenario: 20 kg of hydrogen was 
released in the basic geometry. Sensitivity Test 1: the hydrogen jet was moved to hit the light armature. Sensitivity Test 2: 
the underside of the bridge deck was flat. Sensitivity Test 3: the reléase was from one cylinder instead of four (5 kg instead 
of 20 kg). 
The computational domain extended the borders of the 
underpass by 20 m in the Y direction by 15 m in the X-direction 
and by 15 m in the Z-direction. The computational grid is a non-
uniform Cartesian grid consistingof 68 x 78 x 47 (245622) cells. 
Mínimum cell size is 0.1 m in all three directions located at the 
source. This was kept constant for a región up to 0.5 m from 
the source. Further away a grid expansión of 1.12 was used. The 
presence of solids within the rectangular grid was treated with 
the volume porosity and área permeability approach. 
Initial conditions at the source were set according to the 
Birch et al. [3] approach, i.e. sonic velocity (assumed to be 
1294 m/s), atmospheric pressure and ambient temperature of 
288 K. The source diameter varied in time (0-154 s) to get the 
flow rate given in Fig. 2. Initial fictitious diameter was 
approximately 10.4 cm for the four cylinders case and 5.2 cm 
for the one cylinder case. 
The numerical options used were the first order fully 
implicit scheme for time integration and the first order upwind 
scheme for the discretization of the convective terms. The 
increase of the time step was bounded by applying simulta-
neously two restrictions a máximum allowed time step of 0.1 
seconds and a máximum convective CFL number of 2. 
3.4. UPM 
UPM has used the Fluent 6.2 code. Earlier validation using 
Fluent can be found in [4] and [15]. In the present simulations 
turbulence was modelled using the standard fe-e model. The 
SIMPLE method was employed and a third order MUSCL 
scheme was used for the convective scheme. A fixed time 
stepping method was used ranging from 0.01 to 0.1 s. 
A structured hexahedral mesh was used. The number of 
cells was 660,000 for the base case and Sensitivity Cases 1 and 
3. For Sensitivity Case 2 the grid is the same but without the 
upper part corresponding to z > 5 m, resulting in a mesh of 
193,000 cells. The grid was refined near the H2 reléase (the 
mínimum cell size was 1.5 cm). 
4. Results and discussion 
As mentioned above the objectives of the SBEP were twofold: 
to examine the effect of the presence of the obstructions such 
as I-beams in the roof of the structure and to compare the 
variations between different partner predictions. In the 
discussion below the predictions obtained by different part-
ners are compared first. 
One of the parameters used in assessing the risk of an acci-
dental reléase is the flammable mixture volume, i.e. the volume 
of the hydrogen-air mixture, where hydrogen concentration is 
within the lower and upper flammability limits (4-75% respec-
tively). The predicted flammable mixture volumes by each 
participant as a function of time are shown in Fig. 3 for the four 
cases considered (base plus three sensitivity cases). It can be 
observed that there are similarities but also significant differ-
ences in some cases between different predictions, especially 
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Fig. 4 - Base case: predicted hydrogen concentration time histories at sensors (1-10) locations. 
regarding the size of the máximum predicted flammable 
volume, the time of its occurrence as well as the behaviour of the 
flammable volume history at and beyond the end of the reléase. 
More specifically, for the base case and Sensitivity Tests 1 
and 3, the UPM, NCSRD and JRC predictions show a similarity 
as they predict nearly the same flammable volume at large 
times, while the difference in predicted máximums is not so 
pronounced. On the other hand, GexCon predicts a different 
behaviour with small flammable volume valúes at large times 
for all the above cases and much higher máximum flammable 
volume for the base case and Sensitivity Test 1. For Sensitivity 
Test 2 on the other hand, despite the differences in predicted 
máximum flammable volume, it seems that there is general 
agreement in predicted behaviour between all four 
participants. 
The above shows a general agreement between predictions 
when the underside of the bridge deck is fíat (Sensitivity Test 2), 
and deviations when the underside of the bridge deck includes 
the I-beams (base case, Sensitivity Tests 1 and 3). In the later 
case two different behaviours occur at large times: UPM, JRC 
NCSRD 
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Fig. 5 - Base case: Turbulent kinetic energy predictions on the XZ vertical plañe through the source at time 40 s. Colours: blue 
(<0.1), green (0.1-1.0), yellow (1.0-10), red (>10). (For interpretation of the references to colour in this ñgure legend, the 
reader is referred to the web versión of this article.) 
Fig. 6 - Base case: hydrogen concentration (v/v) predictions on the XZ vertical plañe through the source at time 50 s. Colours: 
blue (< 0.04), green (0.04-0.1), yellow (0.1-0.2), red (> 0.2). (For interpretation of the references to colour in this ñgure legend, 
the reader is referred to the web versión of this article.) 
and NCSRD predict large flammable hydrogen valúes near and 
after the end of the reléase while GexCon predicts flammable 
hydrogen disappearing. 
The above mentioned behaviour is re-examined below in 
the light of the predicted hydrogen concentration time histo-
ries at the selected sensor locations. Fig. 4 shows the predicted 
concentration time histories per partner for the base case 
scenario. For all partners the highest concentration is 
observed for sensor 5, located at Y= 19 m, which is the closest 
to the source. Next in magnitude are sensors 4 and 6 located 
south and north from the source at Y = 15 and Y=23m 
followed by sensors 3 and 7 and so on. The earlier mentioned 
similarity between NCSRD, JRC and UPM can also be observed 
here. The concentration valúes at large times are between 10 
and 20% for NCSRD and UPM and down to 7% for JRC. On the 
other hand the corresponding concentrations as predicted by 
GexCon are less than the lower flammability limit of hydrogen 
(4%), which is consistent with the behaviour observed in Fig. 3. 
Predicted hydrogen concentration histories for Sensitivity 
Test 2 (flat roof at Z = 5 m) are presented in Fig. 7 below to be 
compared with Fig. 4 for the base case. It can be observed that 
the concentrations predicted by all the partners are of similar 
l ime (s 
200 25C 
Fig. 7 - Sensitivity test 2 (flat roof at z = 5 m): predicted hydrogen concentration time histories at sensors (1-10) locations. 
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Fig. 10 - Equivalent stoichiometric cloud volume (Q9) predictions. 
levéis, which is consistent with the similarity observed for the 
predicted flammable volumes in Fig. 3. It can also be observed 
that concentration levéis are lower than for the base case due 
to hydrogen accumulation effects within the I-beams. 
The lower level of concentrations predicted by GexCon in 
Fig. 4 compared to the other partners can be attributed to 
higher levéis of turbulent mixing. This is shown in Fig. 5, 
which presents the predicted turbulent kinetic energy field for 
each partner on the XZ plañe through the source at time 40 s. 
This increased turbulent mixing for GexCon is responsible 
both for the larger máximum flammable volume and for the 
much lower flammable volume at large times. Increased 
mixing leads in general to an increased cloud size but with 
lower concentrations. So increased mixing in a región of high 
concentrations can lead to an increase in the volume of the 
flammable cloud if the concentrations do not drop below the 
lower flammability limit, while increased mixing in a región of 
low concentrations can lead to the disappearance of the 
flammable cloud if concentrations drop below the LFL. A 
comparison of the predicted concentration field for each 
partner on the XZ plañe through the source at time 50 s is 
shown in Fig. 6. It can be observed that the GexCon flammable 
cloud covers most of the underpass cross-section. 
Regarding the source of this increased mixing for GexCon, 
it should be noted that the difference between GexCon and the 
other predictions occurs when the I-beams are present and 
not in case where the underside of the bridge deck is fíat 
(Sensitivity Test 2), so a logical explanation could be to attri-
bute the above mentioned increased turbulence levéis to the 
modelling of the roof structures. Along this line, as mentioned 
in Section 3.1, GexCon uses a model for generation of turbu-
lence behind sub-grid objects and a model for build-up of 
proper turbulence behind objects of a particular size for which 
the discretization produces too little turbulence. The effect of 
these models could be the reason for the above mentioned 
increased turbulence levéis. 
It can also be seen from Fig. 4 that there is a sudden 
increase (kink) in the NCSRD concentration trace for sensor 5 
at around 150 s and a nearly similar kink in the UPM 
concentration at approximately 60 s. It can also be observed 
that for NCSRD the concentrations at this location (nearest the 
source) become the lowest predicted concentrations at around 
100 s. The low hydrogen concentration predicted cióse to the 
source (sensor 5) compared to sensors further away is not 
unreasonable, since the leak rate at 100 s is very low (0.02 kg/s) 
compared to the beginning of the leak (approx 0.9 kg/s). The 
increase in hydrogen concentration at sensor 5 is associated 
to hydrogen re-approaching the source after being trans-
poned and accumulated far from it. The sudden increase 
could be associated with an obstacle effect, i.e. hydrogen 
suddenly passing over an obstacle (cross-bracings). The JRC 
prediction for sensor 5 shows an effect similar to NCSRD and 
UPM, but this effect is only seen at the very end of the outflow 
(around 170 s). Shortly before this time the concentration at 
sensor 5 drops below the concentrations at the neighbouring 
monitor locations. When the flow stops the trapped hydrogen 
mixes with the surroundings and the concentration at sensor 
5 grows slowly. GexCon prediction does not show a similar 
phenomenon. The difference between partners' predictions 
regarding the above concentration increase could be attrib-
uted to the different turbulence modelling schemes used. 
More insight is needed on this special effect in the future. 
The results of the performed sensitivity tests are reported 
below. Fig. 8 shows the predicted flammable volumes per 
partner. NCSRD and UPM predictions show a similarity. With 
the given roof obstructions (base case) the max flammable 
volume is decreased and a large flammable volume is 
preserved up to and beyond the end of reléase compared to 
Sensitivity Test 2. JRC predictions agree with NCSRD and UPM 
as far as the behaviour at large times. For the máximum 
flammable volume JRC predictions show that it remains 
practically unchanged. GexCon's prediction on the other hand 
shows a different behaviour. The máximum flammable 
volume is significantly increased with the I-beams and is 
reduced considerably after the end of reléase. This is associ-
ated with the increased mixing as mentioned above. 
The very important effect of the I-beam structure 
compared to the fíat roof is presented in Fig. 9 which shows 
the predicted flammable mass histories. In the base case there 
is an increase of the máximum flammable mass with respect 
to the fíat roof (Sensitivity Test 2) by 57% according to NCSRD, 
45% according to JRC and 105% according to GexCon, the 
absolute valúes being 13.8, 11.3 and 12.8 kg, respectively. A 
similar and even more pronounced picture is presented in 
Fig. 10 which shows the equivalent stoichiometric cloud 
volume histories. With I-beams the máximum Q9 is increased 
from approximately 25-30 m3 with flat roof to 240 m3 (NCSRD) 
and 120 m3 (GexCon). 
The effect of hitting the light armature was investigated in 
Sensitivity Test 1. Fig. 8 shows that both GexCon and UPM 
predict lower flammable volume in this case as compared to 
the base case. NCSRD on the other hand did not see any 
important difference. Regarding the effect of releasing the 
contents of only one cylinder instead of four (5 kg instead of 
20 kg) in the initial geometry, Fig. 8 shows that the flammable 
volumes are lower in all cases as expected. 
5. Conclusions 
Within the framework ofHySafe NoE, co-fundedby the EC, four 
HySafe partners performed CFD flow and dispersión calcula-
tions for benchmark SBEP-V11 with four different CFD codes, 
ADREA-HF, CFX, FLACS and FLUENT to simúlate a hydrogen 
reléase from a bus in an underpass. The underpass is assumed 
to be of the commonbeam and slab type and construction with 
I-beams spanning across the highway at 3 m centres plus cross 
bracing and light armatures creating cavities where hydrogen 
could potentially accumulate. Four scenarios were examined 
in total. For the base case the reléase was vertically upwards 
from one outlet fed from four cylinders containingin total 20 kg 
of hydrogen at 35 MPa. In Sensitivity Test 1 the source was 
horizontally moved so that the vertical hydrogen jet hit the 
light armature beforereaching the roof. In Sensitivity Test 2 the 
underside of the bridge deck was entirely flat. In Sensitivity 
Test 3 only 5 kg of hydrogen were released instead of 20 kg in 
the base case geometry. The performed simulations led to the 
following conclusions: 
• Comparison between partners' predictions for the flam-
mable volume history showed that there is general agree-
ment when the underside of the bridge deck is flat 
(Sensitivity Test 2) and deviations when the I-beams are 
included (base case, Sensitivity Tests 1 and 3). In the later 
cases two different behaviours were observed at large times: 
NCSRD, JRC and UPM predict large flammable hydrogen 
valúes near and after the end of the reléase while GexCon 
predicts flammable hydrogen disappearing. The behaviour 
as predicted by GexCon was attributed to larger turbulent 
mixing, caused by the modelling of additional turbulence 
behind obstacles of a particular size. 
• The presence of the I-beams leads to higher hydrogen 
concentrations, due to hydrogen-air cloud accumulation 
within the cavities. This was confirmed by all participating 
partners. Flammable volume behaviour on the other hand 
was found to have different trends. NCSRD and UPM found 
a lower máximum flammable volume with I-beams and 
large valúes persisting near and after the end of the reléase, 
while GexCon calculated a higher máximum and valúes 
falling to zero after the end of the reléase. For JRC the 
máximum was not affected by the presence of the beams, 
but the behaviour at large times was similar to UPM and 
NCSRD. The máximum appears early in the transient; at 
that time hydrogen is still concentrated in the jet región. 
According to the JRC simulation the mixing is dominated by 
the momentum of the jet and therefore the presence of I-
beams is not important for the máximum size of the flam-
mable cloud. 
• The effect of the I-beam structure compared to the flat roof 
was found to be very important. In the base case there is an 
increase of the máximum flammable mass with respect to 
the flat roof (Sensitivity Test 2) by 57% according to NCSRD, 
45% according to JRC and 105% according to GexCon, the 
absolute valúes being 13.8, 11.3 and 12.8 kg, respectively. 
Additionally with I-beams the max Q9 are increased from 
approximately 25-30 m3 (both NCSRD and GexCon) with flat 
roof to 240 m3 (NCSRD) and 120 m3 (GexCon). 
• The change in the reléase position such that the jet hits the 
light armature (Sensitivity Test 1) leads to decreased flam-
mable volumes according to GexCon and UPM, while the 
effect was negligible for NCSRD. 
• As expected the reduction of released mass wherein the 
contents of only one cylinder instead of four (5 kg instead of 
20 kg) were emptied in the base geometry (Sensitivity Test 
3), led to significantly lower flammable volumes in the 
simulations of all partners. 
• Finally, the variation between the different models clearly 
demonstrates the need to further valídate CFD models for 
the observed phenomena by conducting experiments 
representative of the environment and range of conditions 
examined within this study. 
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